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Abstract 
Virtue ethics has emerged as an alternative to deontological and utilitarian theory in 
recent moral philosophy. The basic notion of virtue ethics is to reassert the 
importance of virtuous character in ethical judgement in contrast to the emphasis on 
principles and consequences.  Since questions of virtue have been largely neglected in 
modern moral theory, there has been a return to Aristotle’s account of virtue as 
character. This in turn has been questioned as the basis of virtue ethics and there has 
been a search for alternative accounts of moral agency. One aspect of this critical 
reflection on virtue ethics is an engagement with social psychology as a source of 
criticism of the Aristotelian conception of character and as a more plausible 
alternative foundation for a theory of moral character with contemporary relevance. 
This paper aims to introduce this area of moral theory to a psychological audience 
and reflect on the interpretation of social psychological theory and evidence in 
criticisms of virtuous character, focusing on the use of Milgram’s (1974) experiments 
on obedience to authority as an argument for situationism. A number of questions 
emerge concerning the interpretation and use of social psychological theory and 
evidence in debates within moral philosophy. 
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Introduction 
In moral philosophy there has been a recent revival of interest in questions of moral 
agency. After many years of relative neglect and scepticism towards psychological 
aspects of ethical conduct, virtue ethics is experiencing a renaissance. Virtue ethics 
focuses on, and treats as basic, questions of character in contrast to moral judgements 
of action (deontological ethics) and judgements of consequences (utilitarianism). 
Modern moral philosophy has been dominated by deontological theory and 
utilitarianism and the emergence of a new alternative is arousing considerable interest. 
However, virtue ethics is not new; it has its origins in the classical writings of Homer, 
Plato and Aristotle, so the renewed interest in virtue recovers relatively neglected 
texts and traditions. There are a number of excellent monographs and collections of 
readings devoted to the topic, which I will draw on here and which the reader 
interested in finding out more can consult (Darwell, 2003; Dent, 1984;  Hursthouse, 
1999; Statman, 1997). 
The revival of interest in moral agency in philosophy also involves 
confronting the historical scepticism towards philosophy of psychology. These 
developments have potential interest for psychologists and the first aim of this paper 
is to introduce virtue ethics to a psychological audience. However, there is a more 
specific reason for psychologists to be interested in these developments. Some 
philosophers who are broadly sympathetic to a focus on agency in moral questions are 
nevertheless critical of the psychological assumptions in Aristotelian concepts of 
virtue. Writers such as Doris (2002) and Harman (1999), in particular, criticise the use 
of indigenous psychology as a source of concepts for virtue ethics. They argue that 
Aristotle’s assumptions are both anachronous and problematic. Interestingly, they 
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base their critique upon a reading of examples from contemporary experimental social 
psychology. 
The second aim of this paper is to examine the way that social psychological 
research is interpreted in these philosophical writings. I am not attempting here to 
contribute to debates in virtue ethics as a domain in philosophy, where there are 
disagreements about the implications of empirical findings from social psychology for 
virtue ethics. These range from the view that the results of social psychology 
experiments require a radical reformulation of the presuppositions about character 
made in virtue ethics (e.g. Harman, 1999; Doris, 2002) through the idea that such 
findings are irrelevant to philosophical discourse (e.g. Hursthouse, 1999; Sreenivasan, 
1997). Nor is my concern to arbitrate between these different views but rather to 
examine the ways in which moral philosophers interpret empirical social psychology. 
In this paper I will focus on the interpretation given to Milgram in the work of Doris 
(2002) and Harman (1999) in particular, for two reasons. First, because they argue 
that social psychology provides a substantive critique of virtue as character because it 
demonstrates the dependency of human conduct on social situational determinants. 
Second, because they both draw on social psychological research and theory in 
developing positive proposals for virtue ethics, arguing that empirical social 
psychology is a potentially better source of normative assumptions for an ethical 
theory based on character than are the speculative reflections on virtue in writers from 
Aristotle to the present day. Again, my focus is not on the validity of these arguments 
per se or on evaluating their place in philosophical debates over virtue ethics but on 
the interpretation of social psychological theory. 
As a social psychologist I am interested in these developments for several 
reasons. One is the novelty of philosophers paying attention to social psychology 
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compared with the greater engagement with cognitive and physiological psychology 
to be found in writings in the philosophy of mind (see Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, 
1996, for a review). While there has been a productive and valuable interchange 
between philosophers and psychologists over questions of consciousness, experience 
and representation, there has been little direct interplay over social psychological 
questions and theory. In the face of this lack of interest, social psychologists 
concerned with philosophical questions have tended to engage with continental 
philosophy and social theory rather than analytic philosophy. The deployment of 
evidence and arguments from social psychology in analytic moral philosophy 
therefore arouses curiosity. Several questions immediately suggest themselves: Which 
social psychology have moral philosophers been reading? How do they interpret the 
findings of social psychology? What notice do they take of the theories of social 
psychologists? How do they deploy their reflections on social psychology in their own 
debates?  But before addressing these points I will introduce virtue ethics. 
Virtue Ethics 
Virtue ethics has a long history and a short past. Although its origins can be 
traced back to Plato and Aristotle, for many years moral philosophers have eschewed 
discussion of virtuous character in favour of questions of duty. Initially the idea of a 
reconsideration of questions of virtue was the subject of the occasional piece, notably 
those by Anscombe (1958) and Foot (1978); questions of virtue were also at the 
centre of MacIntyre’s (1981) influential work After Virtue. More recently there has 
been an explosion of interest in virtue ethics. Statman (1997) documents the rapid rise 
of virtue ethics as a response to growing dissatisfaction with the entrenched 
opposition between utilitarianism and deontology, and to the desire for an alternative 
approach to ethical theory. This was partly given impetus by the development of 
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practical questions in medical or legal ethics that were complex and contextual, 
amenable neither to the categorical imperative nor to the analysis of utility. Questions 
of choice in medicine and the law often seem to turn on the qualities displayed by 
moral agents in their role as patients or doctors, clients and lawyers in complex social 
institutional contexts. Such observations appeared to be anomalies for traditional 
accounts, inviting a radical shift in moral theory. 
In his book After Virtue MacIntyre (1981) started from a scepticism 
concerning accounts of morality based on duty and sought to address the imperative 
to find an alternative foundation for ethics in the contemporary age. He notes that 
scepticism towards abstract moral principles is widespread in contemporary culture 
and argues that this scepticism has led to the rise of emotivism in moral theory and in 
ethical practice. Emotivism argues that it is a ‘mistake’ to think that foundations for 
moral theories, and consequently ethical judgments, are possible at all in principle; 
instead, moral statements should be read as attempts to persuade. MacIntyre partially 
accepts and partially rejects this position. He suggests that many contemporary moral 
dilemmas (e.g. abortion, the dependency of justice on equality, and the use of military 
power in international relations) are widely debated and contested even though there 
appears to be little chance of agreement, consensus or resolution of such dilemmas 
and that attempts to resolve them seem to make matters worse by producing 
increasingly polarised and entrenched positions. Thus, MacIntyre agrees that many 
contemporary moral debates are best understood as expressions of opposed positions 
grounded in deeply incommensurable views, and that what appears to be moral 
argument is often no more than an attempt to persuade people to one view or another. 
But here MacIntyre parts company with the emotivists. They would argue that moral 
disputes are to be entirely understood as discursive constructions and that it is a 
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mistake to think that there are any foundations for moral positions or that there can be 
any substantive moral arguments or debates. In contrast, MacIntyre (1981) takes the 
view that what has lead to this position is the deployment of outmoded conceptions of 
moral theory and debate, and that it is not necessary to reject in principle the use of 
moral reasoning of any kind in any circumstance. Indeed, MacIntyre suggests that 
mainstream deontological and utilitarian theory still provide sound models of moral 
reasoning but that their purchase has loosened on contemporary debates. The problem 
is that people espouse deeply held moral positions that are incommensurable with 
their alternatives but they still argue as if principled moral justification and resolution 
were possible by recourse to universal criteria of judgement or an analysis of the 
consequences of action. For MacIntyre, radically opposed positions on key moral 
debates are not resolvable through such arguments: no consensus can be reached 
because such arguments cannot be ‘reframed’ in terms that stand outside the 
foundational commitments of the moral positions taken. Consequently, there is 
nothing to be done except to argue one’s position as strongly as possible, and this 
appears to be the nature of contemporary moral judgement and debate. 
Virtue ethics provides a potential way forward because it can be used to 
articulate the basis of personal commitments and it links an analysis of the moral 
agent to duty expressed as obligations in social contexts. The shift in emphasis to the 
agent reverses the relation between right conduct and virtue. The utilitarian position 
focuses on the consequences of behaviour as the basis for moral judgement, thereby 
sidestepping the motivations of the moral agent. Deontological positions take virtue to 
be the following of duty or moral principle wherever possible. Both positions make 
virtue depend upon prior definitions of right behaviour. In contrast, virtue ethics gives 
analytic priority to virtue and considers action to be right to the extent that it is an 
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expression of virtuous character. Moral philosophers have returned to classical 
accounts of human character and to Aristotle’s account of the virtues, in particular as 
a way of reinvigorating the philosophical account of moral agency. Aristotle had 
focussed in his ethics, as in much of his philosophy, on classifying and ordering 
conceptions of human nature (McIntyre, 1981; Harman, 1999). 
  What is virtue or good character according to Aristotle? Aristotle finesses 
indigenous or common sense concepts of virtues as character traits, distinguishing 
character traits from other dimensions of human psychology such as innate aspects of 
temperament (e.g. shyness or optimism) and psychological disorders (Harman, 1999). 
Not all character traits, however, are virtues for some are value-neutral traits (such as 
friendliness and talkativeness). However, the virtues do share the nature of all 
character traits in that they are relatively long-term dispositions to act in distinctive 
ways. Harman (1999) gives the example of an honest person disposed to act honestly 
and a kind person disposed to act kindly. These dispositions have a dual aspect 
combining ability or knowledge (know how) with motivation (habits of desire), a 
combination familiar in social psychology as cognition and motivation. A virtuous 
person has to know how to “do being honest” but that is not enough for them to be 
virtuous – they must also be generally inclined to be honest, all things being equal. 
Both knowledge and desire are necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the 
attribution of a virtue. Aristotle also suggested that character traits were best 
understood as a series of opposite temperaments and that virtues were often moderate 
dispositions that fall between extremes that tend to be vices (a general idea of restraint 
underpins this notion of virtuous character). Harman (1999) gives the example of 
courage as a virtuous character trait halfway between timidity and rashness; 
benevolence is similarly positioned between stinginess and profligacy.  
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Another feature of the common sense psychology of virtue is the observations 
that people differ in terms of the possession of virtuous character traits; some have a 
given virtue, others have the equivalent vice. These dispositions are graded so that 
individuals are more or less honest or benevolent. Character is revealed when people 
behave differently in similar circumstances. For example (again from Harman), on 
finding a wallet on the pavement an honest person will try to locate the owner 
whereas the dishonest person will take the money and throw away the wallet. The 
indigenous or common sense psychology of virtuous character suggests that in such 
circumstances the person behaves in the way they did because they were disposed to 
be either honest or dishonest. Character traits are broad-based dispositions covering a 
range of behaviours. Attributions to underlying traits of character are withheld for 
specific aberrations: for example, Harman (1999) suggests that being afraid of riding 
a roller coaster is not sufficient to ascribe cowardice as a character trait to the 
individual.  
Character traits are understood to be relatively independent; for example, 
courage cannot be inferred from honesty. One aspect of Aristotle’s ethics that Harman 
(1999) relatively neglects is the notion of telos or the good life that results from 
virtuous action, together with the idea that institutional forms and social contexts 
create the conditions for virtuous conduct. Virtue ethics suggests that moral education 
is best achieved by teaching people the relevant habits of action, habits of desire and 
the relevant knowledge and skills (Harman, 1999). It also has implications for how 
moral judgements can be made, suggesting that what a person ought to do in a given 
situation is modelled on what a person of good character would do. Thus, although 
virtue ethics is concerned with virtuous character, conduct and situation, it is also a 
normative moral theory that places more emphasis on character than other moral 
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theories, but one that also includes conceptions of human flourishing and the good 
society. 
Although there are different versions of virtue ethics, Harman (1999) suggests 
that they all make three common assumptions: that there are people who do have 
character traits of the appropriate kind; that people differ in which character traits they 
possess; and that possession of these traits helps to explain differences in the way that 
people behave. In sum, virtue ethics implies a moral psychology. At the very least, 
such assumptions raise a number of social psychological questions, which I will now 
discuss. 
Social psychology and virtue ethics 
The first person to directly raise questions of the relationship between social 
psychology and the fledgling virtue ethics was Flanagan (1991). Although he did not 
think that social psychological theory and data could be used to develop a radical 
critique of Aristotle’s account, he argued that social psychology raises a number of 
important issues and questions for moral theory. Harman (1999) disagrees with this 
assessment, regarding social psychology as providing the moral philosopher with a 
number of important criticisms of the Aristotelian tradition. Referring to the work of 
Ross and Nisbett (1991), Harman argues that there is abundant evidence that 
common-sense psychology or lay theories are so subject to bias as to be considered 
wrong and wrong-headed. If indigenous psychology is error prone in the ways 
suggested by authors such as Ross and Nisbett (1991), then this raises important 
questions about Aristotle’s account of virtue as character traits. One of the biases 
articulated by Ross and Nisbett (1991) is the actor-observer difference, in which 
people make radically different interpretations of actions depending on whether they 
are in the position of actor or observer. The principal difference is a tendency for 
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actors to attribute their actions to situational determinants and observers to personal 
traits. If indigenous psychologies are based on the observation of others’ behaviour, 
then they are likely to over-emphasise the importance of personal characteristics 
compared with features of the situation. So, since Aristotle based his theory of virtue 
on such indigenous insights, then he is also likely to have overstated the role of 
personal factors and to have underestimated the impact of situational factors in human 
conduct. 
The general idea that contemporary experimental social psychology provides 
counter-intuitive findings that challenge the voracity of common sense is 
complemented by an examination of particular experimental findings. The famous 
experiments by Milgram (1974) into obedience to authority have received special 
attention from moral philosophers who wish to challenge the adoption of an 
Aristotelian account of virtuous character in theories of moral agency (Doris, 2002; 
Harman, 1999). As is widely known, Milgram’s experiments demonstrated that a high 
proportion of individuals would subject fellow participants to excruciating electric 
shocks under the instruction of an experimenter, although, in reality, the experiments 
were role-plays and no harm came to the recipient of the electric shocks. The point 
here is that since the naïve subjects in the experiment did not know that the person to 
whom they were delivering the electric shocks was a confederate, they applied these 
shocks against their personal inclination and even though it caused them considerable 
stress. Harman (1999) concludes that this shows the link between virtue and conduct 
to be fragile in practice because of the binding impact of social conditions. He goes so 
far as to suggest that there is a consensus amongst social psychologists towards 
situationism in the person-situation debate. For Harman, these findings violate the 
assumption in virtue ethics that conduct is caused by character and consequently they 
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have important implications for how moral agency should be theorised. Harman 
concludes that if the account of character that emerges in social psychology 
experiments is valid, then instead of teaching virtue in character, we should, taking 
account of the biases of indigenous psychology and the power of situational 
determinants in social behaviour, teach people to overcome their judgement biases 
and to resist situational pressures and inter-group conflict, so as to create greater 
tolerance of difference. This is certainly a contrast with Aristotle’s account of virtuous 
character and shifts the emphasis away from restraint of character to the correction of 
judgement, and away from teaching caution in habits of desire towards teaching 
awareness of conflict and difference. 
Harman takes social psychological evidence to provide an important account 
of the barriers to ethical conduct in contemporary life. He thus addresses MacIntyre’s 
account of the contemporary scene by arguing that constraints due to social pressure 
set the context for ethical judgements and conduct. In other words, the conditions of 
life in contemporary society impress themselves on the individual as constraints and 
complexity in a way that is not accounted for by Aristotle’s account of the relation 
between virtuous character and telos. 
Critical reflection 
 Before I present my critical reflections on Harman’s interpretation of social 
psychological theory and findings I should repeat that the interest amongst moral 
philosophers in social psychology is to be welcomed and that I am inclined to agree 
with Harman (1999) that there are important connections between social psychology 
and moral theory. However, there are a number of questions to be asked about how 
Harman interprets and makes use of writings in social psychology. I should also say 
that his position does not represent a consensus amongst moral philosophers. Indeed 
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Sreenivasan (2002) has explicitly repudiated the efforts of Harman (1999) and Doris 
(2002), on the grounds that social psychological research inadequately operationalises 
the notion of character as virtue, although he does not directly interrogate Doris’ and 
Harman’s interpretation of social psychological theory and findings. It is also true, of 
course, that Ross and Nisbett (1991) and Milgram (1974) did not set out to test the 
relation between virtuous character and moral conduct. Nevertheless, Harman (1999) 
and Doris (2002) offer a constructive development of Flanagan’s (1991) initial view 
that social psychology raises issues for moral philosophy, issues that are central to the 
presuppositions of virtue ethics. 
I will make a number of criticisms of Harman’s (1999) argument: first, that he 
is highly selective and only considers particular and not necessarily representative 
theories and data from social psychology; second, that he neglects important aspects 
of both Milgram’s (1974) and Nisbett and Ross’ (1991) theory; and third, that he is 
wrong in his broad-brush characterisation of a social psychological consensus on 
situationism, instead arguing that interactionism expresses the norm in social 
psychology. These points not only concern the detail of Harman’s (1999) 
interpretation of social psychological theory and experiment but also give rise to a 
number of deeper and more significant misgivings that I have with his argument. Both 
Harman and Doris write with considerable naivety about the methodology of 
Milgram’s experiment. I shall suggest that the Milgram experiment can be interpreted 
as leading to conclusions directly opposite to those reached by Harman. In 
consequence, questions are raised concerning the status that Doris (2002) and Harman 
(1999) grant to Milgram’s experiment as science, which in turn lead me to contest the 
claims that Milgram is both opposed to common sense and independent of moral 
theory. Both Harman (1999) and Doris (2002) place a great deal of store by the 
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‘situationist’ social psychology of Ross and Nisbett (1991). However, if we examine 
Ross and Nisbett’s (1991) book, The Person and the Situation, we see that there is 
plenty of evidence for the interaction of personality and situational variables and that 
the authors acknowledge the mutual interdependence of the person and the situation. 
For example, they examine the way that people create their own environments 
through choosing and altering situations. This is far removed from the picture of their 
work in Harman’s and Doris’ work. Throughout their writings, Ross and Nisbett 
(1991) are concerned to counter what they see as the over-dependence of social 
psychology on common-sense psychology but it would be wrong to conclude that 
they deny the importance of personal characteristics in social behaviour. Harman and 
Doris pit the social psychologists against the layperson by suggesting that lay people 
are all personologists and social psychologists are all situationists, thereby missing the 
central insight of social psychology that human conduct is the result of the interaction 
between persons and situations, indeed that they co-constitute each other. 
The subtlety of the relation between persons and situations is also an important 
feature of Milgram’s (1974) theory and experimental designs. Harman and Doris 
particularly neglect Milgram’s theoretical contributions. Milgram combines an 
interpretation of the binding factors in the interactional setting of the experiment with 
a social learning explanation of the establishment of norms of personal responsibility 
and obedience to authority that are placed in conflict in the experimental context. 
Milgram explains the behaviour of subjects in his experiment as a reaction to the 
proximal social pressures in the situation mediated by the internalisation of social 
norms, which result from the more distal socialisation of the individual. In their 
commentaries, Harman and Doris miss the important detail that the subject and the 
confederate are introduced to each other at the start of the experiment as if they were 
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both subjects. The experiment is then described to both ‘subjects’ and a coin is tossed 
to see who will occupy the role of teacher (to administer the electric shocks) and 
learner (who will receive the shocks). This procedure establishes pre-commitment in 
the subject, which is strengthened by the use of graduated shocks, which start at a 
mild 15 volts and are only gradually increased to dangerous levels. The reason for the 
graduation of intensity of shocks has to be understood in terms of Milgram’s theory of 
norm competition (a widespread theory in social psychology at the time). At the 
beginning of the trials and having gained commitment through the briefing and coin 
tossing, the subject is put in a position that favours the norm of obedience to authority 
since the harm to the learner is mild, as was demonstrated by giving them an 
illustrative electric shock of 15 volts, so that they understood what they were going to 
be doing to the (confederate) subject. Consequently, at the start of the experiment, the 
electric shock could plausibly be thought of as a mild device to punish the learner for 
making mistakes (the rationale that was presented to the subject). As the experiment 
progressed, the subjects found themselves in circumstances that more and more 
favoured the norms of personal responsibility (when intense shock causes discomfort 
and pain). Milgram takes the point at which the subject refuses to apply the shocks as 
indicating that the initial commitment to the norm of obedience to authority has been 
superseded by the norm of personal responsibility.  Harman’s interpretation, however, 
is that Milgram’s experiment demonstrates that human conduct is determined by 
context, thus missing an important feature of the study. Milgram was using a set of 
controlled circumstances to examine what was, for him, a process of social judgement 
based on conflict between internalised but opposing norms. 
 Although Harman interprets Milgram’s experiment as unproblematically 
revealing that social behaviour is determined by situational factors, there have been 
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many criticisms of Milgram’s experiment within social psychology widely repeated in 
social psychology textbooks. These include criticisms of the ambiguity of the 
situation, the limitations on the subject’s role in the experiment, the isolation of the 
subject, the generalisability of the findings and the ethics of the research. Not only 
have Harman and Doris no critique of the experiment as a social occasion, but the 
interpretation that they come to has often been questioned in social psychology. In 
particular, the focus on the 65% who obey in the most austere version of the 
experiment leaves out the fact that 35% refused the commands of authority. This was, 
in Milgram’s terms, because they chose to follow the norm of personal responsibility 
– how can their behaviour be accounted for if the situation determines behaviour? 
Also, crucially, in the numerous variations that Milgram conducted, there were many 
occasions when the level of obedience to authority was much lower (even as low as 
9%). Strictly speaking, this was not an experiment, but a demonstration of responses 
to norm conflict in an artificial situation, a role-play. Milgram (1974) went on to 
subject this demonstration to a number of experimental manipulations that, which 
varied features of the relationship between the experimenter and the subject and 
between the confederate and the subject. The key variation was social distance 
(proximity between teacher and learner and visibility of learner and experimenter). 
Since most of the variations in proximity produced a marked reduction in obedience, 
it emerged that the original demonstration turned out to be a very special situation 
indeed. 
 Implicitly, Harman (1999) and Doris (2002) treat social psychology as an 
empirical science entirely separate from moral philosophy. Indeed, the force of their 
argument is that psychological knowledge is exogenous to philosophical discourse 
and so can be used to critique Aristotle and to arbitrate among philosophical accounts 
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of virtue. Yet, in Obedience to Authority, Milgram starts his deliberations by 
explicitly considering the impasse between contract theory and utilitarianism. 
Milgram took this impasse as an important motivation for an empirical social 
psychological exploration of ethics. He goes so far as to suggest that moral 
philosophy is moribund and that we should look to social psychology to answer moral 
questions. He also cites the influence of Arendt’s (1963) ideas of the banality of evil, 
couching the rationale for his experiment in terms of moral theory as an exploration of 
the limits of conscience and the inadequacy of explanations of extremes of human 
conduct. His experiments, in other words, were an attempt to operationalise the 
dilemmas that face people in their everyday lives when they have to choose between 
norms of obedience to authority and personal responsibility. The value of the role-
play experiment is that it created a motivating context in which these norms could be 
pitched against each other so as to place the subject in a moral dilemma. Milgram also 
had in mind the acquiescence of ordinary people under the extreme conditions of Nazi 
Germany. Indeed this is the historical and ethical context usually used to introduce his 
work. Thus, we could say that Milgram used the social psychology role-play 
experiment as a concrete realization of contemporary moral dilemmas, attempting to 
replace thought experiments with these controlled performances. 
This is not just an argument about the rationale for Milgram’s experiments. I 
was struck, when reading both MacIntyre’s and Harman’s accounts of Aristotle, by 
how his ethics resembles the social psychology that emerged in the interwar years in 
the USA. The central concepts of ‘attitude’ and ‘value’ in particular embody many 
features of Aristotelian character traits. Historians of social psychology have 
emphasised how the emergence of social psychology in the USA during the interwar 
years was against the grain of the European emphasis on the relation between 
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individual and collective consciousness (Richards, 2003; Danziger, 1990; Farr, 1996). 
Indeed, the emerging social psychology in the USA was more concerned with 
relations among individuals and with the problems of co-ordinating or organising 
human action across lines of social difference for the pragmatic purposes of trading 
and living in relative harmony. These considerations have a clear overlap with the 
Aristotelian world view and stand in contrast to the preceding, more collectivist 
orientation of European social psychology. Richards (2003) and Cartwright (1997) 
have argued that the Second World War led to a distillation and dominance of 
individualist social psychology as typified by the research cited by Doris and Harman. 
Although Harman and Doris treat social psychology as independent of philosophical 
discourse, social psychology is not neutral with respect to the differences between 
moral theories. I argue, indeed, that social psychology can only be understood as an 
encoding of various philosophical assumptions, making it inappropriate to treat social 
psychology as a ‘test’ of the psychological presuppositions of moral theory in the way 
advocated by Doris (2002) and Harman (1999). What is called for is a more nuanced 
analysis of the relationship between philosophical discourse and social psychological 
research. 
Reinterpreting Milgram’s Moral Experiment 
 Although there are legitimate questions concerning the interpretation of 
Milgram’s experiment made by moral philosophers, I do think that the encounter with 
virtue ethics raises some interesting points about Milgram’s work. From Milgram’s 
point of view his experimental situation exemplifies norm conflict, where people have 
to judge whether they should obey the norm of personal responsibility or the norm of 
obedience to authority. The Aristotelian conception of virtue treats character traits as 
independent, whereas Milgram forces people to choose between two virtues and this 
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may partially explain the strain that people felt in the study. These considerations also 
point to some ambiguity in the experiment, since obedience to authority in the USA in 
the early 1960s is socially valued whereas it is retrospectively considered a vice in 
relation to Nazi Germany. Under a different interpretation, we could say that whatever 
the subjects in Milgram’s experiment did was virtuous; those who chose not to shock 
could be said to exhibit the virtue of personal responsibility, those who did shock 
exhibiting the virtue of obedience to authority. Furthermore, the Aristotelian 
conception of character combines knowledge and desire and surely these dual aspects 
of character are also placed under strain in the Milgram experiment. The authority 
figure is also one of expertise and the whole set-up was clearly very unusual from the 
point of view of the subjects. We could say that they had little know-how to fall back 
on in this strange situation and it is difficult to see what their desires might be. As 
Aristotle suggests, it is difficult to act virtuously with neither knowledge nor desire. 
 Taken together, these points suggest the opposite of Harman and Doris’ 
conclusion that the Milgram experiments demonstrate that character has no purchase 
on ethical conduct. Indeed, it seems that the Milgram experiment is a highly complex, 
contrived, unusual, constructed set of circumstances. Harman reads the experiment as 
indicating how easily people are influenced by circumstances when making ethical 
judgements. On the contrary, the great deal of trouble that Milgram goes to by 
scripting a complex occasion with props, setting and a complex interactional script 
involving several actors in a role-play all indicates how difficult it is to get people to 
forgo their personal responsibility and accept the conditions they are in as binding. In 
other words it took an amazing and unusual set of circumstances to get people to 
follow situational constraints and even when they did so they expressed an internal 
conflict of character. 
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Conclusions 
This paper was stimulated by the encouraging engagement by moral 
philosophers with theory and evidence in social psychology as a serious attempt to 
relate social psychological findings to philosophical presuppositions about character. 
We have seen that there are convincing arguments that social psychology, at the very 
least, provides insights which challenge Aristotelian conceptions of character and 
which provide alternative suggestions regarding the barriers to virtuous conduct, 
together with implications for ethical judgement and moral education. Consideration 
of philosophical arguments about social psychology has also led to some interesting 
interpretations of Milgram’s experiment. I have identified a number of problems with 
Doris’ (2002) and Harman’s (1999) interpretation of social psychology. The selection 
of material, the interpretation of theory and results, the implicit account of the 
experimental method and the understanding of the relationship between philosophical 
discourse and experimental social psychology have all been challenged. On balance, 
these problems bring Doris’ (2002) and Harman’s (1999) interpretations into 
question. However, these criticisms do, ironically, support Harman’s view that social 
psychology can provide a way of interrogating and criticising philosophical 
assumptions about virtue. 
However, the point of view that emerges here is that philosophical discourse 
and empirical social psychology cannot be regarded as completely autonomous and, 
further, that social psychological theory is as relevant to issues of virtue as are 
empirical findings. Harman (1999) and Doris (2002) treat empirical research in social 
psychology as equivalent to the thought experiment in philosophical discourse, the 
implication being that philosophers need not bother themselves with the problematic 
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details of theoretical and practical contexts but only with the headline findings. In 
contrast, I hope to have demonstrated that the relations between philosophy and social 
psychology are more complex but not less fruitful for that. 
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